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UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT 
___________ 
 
No. 13-2322 
___________ 
 
RICHARD AUGUST RHOADS, 
     Appellant 
 
v. 
 
STATE OF MARYLAND JUDICIARY; BANK OF AMERICA 
____________________________________ 
 
On Appeal from the United States District Court 
for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania 
(D.C. Civil Action No. 2-13-cv-01913) 
District Judge:  Honorable Michael M. Baylson 
____________________________________ 
 
Submitted Pursuant to Third Circuit LAR 34.1(a) 
October 15, 2013 
Before:  JORDAN, GREENAWAY, JR. and SCIRICA, Circuit Judges 
 
(Opinion filed:  October 15, 2013) 
___________ 
 
OPINION 
___________ 
 
PER CURIAM 
 Pro se Appellant Richard August Rhoads appeals from the District Court’s order 
sua sponte dismissing his complaint.  For the reasons set forth below, we will affirm the 
District Court’s order. 
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I. 
We agree with the District Court that Rhoads’ complaint is unclear and that it is 
difficult to discern the bases of his claims.  Nonetheless, we have repeatedly emphasized 
that, when addressing the claims of a pro se litigant, we have a special obligation to 
construe his submissions liberally.  See Higgs v. Att’y Gen., 655 F.3d 333, 339 (3d Cir. 
2011) (citations omitted).  That an appellant’s filings are difficult to understand does not 
relieve us or opposing counsel of the duty to try to discern what he wishes to challenge.  
Id.  With that in mind, it appears that Rhoads’ complaint, filed in April 2013 against the 
State of Maryland Judiciary and the Bank of America, arises from two foreclosure actions 
brought by Bank of America in the beginning of 2003 against Rhoads in Maryland, 
which ultimately led to Rhoads’ eviction from his mobile home in March 2003.1
                                              
1 In January 2003, Bank of America initiated the first foreclosure action, which resulted 
in judgment in favor of Rhoads.  According to the complaint, a week later, Bank of 
America initiated a second foreclosure action against Rhoads, which ultimately led to his 
eviction. 
  In 
August 2003, Rhoads was stopped by a police officer for what Rhoads has described as 
an “illegal traffic stop.”  For reasons unknown on the present record, Rhoads had to serve 
eighteen months of supervised probation as a result of the traffic stop.  In his brief, 
Rhoads alleges that his probation officer would not allow him to be involved in any court 
activity, despite the fact that he “tried to convince her that [he] needed to file a civil claim 
to recover [his] property and the damages they caused [him].” 
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Ultimately, Rhoads filed a “counter complaint” in the second foreclosure case in 
2009.  In the present lawsuit, Rhoads complains that his 2009 claims were not properly 
managed by the Maryland court, and he alleges that Bank of America and its attorneys 
misled the court and filed motions that contained “scandalous” and “slanderous” 
accusations.  Rhoads’ claims were dismissed after a trial in April 2010, and his appeal 
was dismissed because his brief did not comply with the applicable court rules. 
We agree with the District Court that Rhoads appears to be raising tort claims 
under Maryland law and that his complaint can be construed to raise due process claims 
under 42 U.S.C. § 1983.  Rhoads also asks the Court to “make a full review” of the 
Maryland cases.  Based on these claims, the District Court sua sponte dismissed Rhoads’ 
complaint with prejudice for failure to state a claim pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §§ 
1915(e)(2)(B)(ii).  This appeal followed. 
II. 
We exercise jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1291.  Our review of the District 
Court’s sua sponte dismissal of Rhoads’ complaint for failure to state a claim is plenary.  
See Allah v. Seiverling, 229 F.3d 220, 223 (3d Cir. 2000).  Whether a complaint should 
be dismissed under § 1915 because it fails to state a claim is assessed under the same 
standard as a motion to dismiss pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6).  Id.  In order to 
survive dismissal under that standard, “a complaint must contain sufficient factual matter, 
accepted as true, to ‘state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.’”  Ashcroft v. 
Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (quoting Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 
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(2007)).  In deciding whether the District Court’s dismissal of Rhoads’ complaint was 
proper, we “accept as true the factual allegations in the complaint and all reasonable 
inferences that can be drawn therefrom.”  Nami v. Fauver, 82 F.3d 63, 65 (3d Cir. 1996). 
III. 
 We will affirm the District Court’s dismissal of Rhoads’ complaint.  First, to the 
extent that Rhoads seeks review of the Maryland court decisions issued against him, the 
District Court was correct in asserting that the Rooker-Feldman doctrine precludes it 
from exercising jurisdiction over those claims.  See Great W. Mining & Mineral Co. v. 
Fox Rothschild LLP, 615 F.3d 159, 165 (3d Cir. 2010) (the Rooker-Feldman doctrine 
deprives federal district courts of jurisdiction “over suits that are essentially appeals from 
state-court judgments.”).  Second, absent a waiver, the Eleventh Amendment “make[s] 
states generally immune from suit by private parties in federal court. . . . This immunity 
extends to state agencies and departments.”  MCI Telecomm. Corp. v. Bell Atl. 
Pennsylvania, 271 F.3d 491, 503 (3d Cir. 2001).  Maryland has not waived its Eleventh 
Amendment immunity with respect to Rhoads’ claims and, thus, his claims against 
Maryland and its judiciary fail.  See, e.g., Weller v. Dep't of Soc. Servs. for City of 
Baltimore, 901 F.2d 387, 397 (4th Cir. 1990) (“Appellant has not suggested to this Court 
that Maryland has waived its immunity to actions brought in federal court, nor have we 
discovered any such waiver.  The waiver of sovereign immunity in the Maryland Torts 
Claims Act clearly limits the state's waiver of immunity to actions brought in the 
Maryland state courts.”).  
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 Turning to Rhoads’ claims against Bank of America, to the extent that he is 
asserting any constitutional claims, the District Court properly dismissed these claims 
because Bank of America is not a state actor for purposes of § 1983.  See Groman v. 
Township of Manaplan, 47 F.3d 628, 638 (3d Cir. 1995) (“there is no liability under § 
1983 for those not acting under color of law.”).  See also, Apao v. Bank of New York, 
324 F.3d 1091, 1095 (9th Cir. 2003) (holding that a bank using non-judicial foreclosure 
procedure provided by state law was not a state actor for § 1983 purposes).   
 With respect to any potential state law claims against Bank of America, including 
malicious abuse of process, abuse of process, and conversion, the District Court correctly 
concluded that Rhoads did not state any timely claims against Bank of America under 
Maryland law because the claims are governed by a three-year statute of limitations 
under Maryland law.  See Md. Code Ann., Cts. & Jud. Proc. § 5-101.   The events at 
issue occurred in 2003, and Rhoads did not bring this suit until 2013.2
                                              
2 Because we conclude that the suit is untimely, there is no need to discuss the specific 
elements of each potential claim. 
  Similarly, any 
potential defamation claim Rhoads asserts is barred by the one-year statute of limitations.  
See Md. Code Ann., Cts. & Jud. Proc. § 5-105.  The motions that Rhoads asserts 
contained “slanderous” and “scandalous” allegations were filed in April 2010 and, thus, 
the defamation claim is untimely.  Ordinarily, the statute of limitations is an affirmative 
defense which must be pleaded and is subject to waiver, see Chainey v. Street, 523 F.3d 
200, 209 (3d Cir. 2008), but untimeliness may justify sua sponte dismissal where “it is 
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clear from the face of the complaint that there are no meritorious tolling issues, or the 
Court has provided the plaintiff notice and an opportunity to be heard.”  Vasquez Arroyo 
v. Starks, 589 F.3d 1091, 1097 (3d Cir. 2009).  Our review of the complaint convinces us 
that the District Court correctly found that any potential state law claims were clearly 
time-barred and that no meritorious tolling issues were present.   
III. 
For the foregoing reasons, we agree with the District Court that dismissal was 
proper.  Accordingly, we will affirm.3
                                                                                                                                                  
 
 
3 We conclude that the District Court did not abuse its discretion in not giving Rhoads 
leave to amend his complaint because amending the complaint would be futile.  Grayson 
v. Mayview State Hosp., 293 F.3d 103, 114 (3d Cir. 2002). 
 
